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The Lure of the Simplistic
John Dupre´†
University of Exeter
This paper attacks the perennial philosophical and scientific quest for a simple and
unified vision of the world. Without denying the attraction of this vision, I argue that
such a goal often seriously distorts our understanding of complex phenomena. The
argument is illustrated with reference to simplistic attempts to provide extremely general
views of biology, and especially of human nature, through the theory of evolution.
Although that theory is a fundamental ingredient of our scientific world view, it pro-
vides only one of a number of perspectives that are required for an understanding of
biology in general, and human behaviour in paticular. The argument is connected to
the replacement of views of science in terms of universal laws with views that emphasise
ranges of models more locally suited to specific phenomena.
My title, I hope, speaks for itself. It is related to something much more
innocuous, the attraction of the simple. Simplicity is often a good thing:
it avoids the hazards of the over-sophisticated, the baroque, or even the
decadent. And many attractive things are worth pursuing. But when some-
thing attractive becomes a lure, it is leading us somewhere we shouldn’t
want to go—into a trap, or up the garden path, for instance. And when
the simple becomes simplistic it becomes naive, unsubtle, or just mis-
guided. Simplicity has often been suggested as a virtue of scientific theories
or scientific explanation, and perhaps it is. But this is also a domain in
which the simple all too often merges into the simplistic. Or so I shall
claim.
As theologians have long been aware, one path to simplicity is unity.
Some philosophers and scientists still maintain that there is only one fun-
damental law of nature. Everything else is just details. (Recalling the par-
allel with theology, there is just one true God, and the devil is in the
details.) I shall not be concerned here with such a rarified claim to the
simplicity of nature, but rather with narrower, if still ambitious claims for
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smaller, if still substantial, domains of the natural world. My main topic
will be the theory of evolution.
Theodosius Dobzhansky famously remarked that nothing in biology
makes sense except in the light of the theory of evolution. Perhaps so. But
that is very far from the claim that everything in biology does make sense
in the light of the theory of evolution. We, the members of Homo sapiens,
are surely included within the broad umbrella of ‘everything in biology’.
And I suppose that we don’t make much sense apart from the theory of
evolution. That theory is, after all, our best account of how we came to
be here at all. But I have been arguing for some years that the light of
evolutionary theory, though it may wonderfully illuminate our origins,
does little to help us understand what we currently do or why.1 Simplifiers
or unifiers will hope to show that one fundamental theory will provide the
key to a whole domain such as that of Life on Earth, or even just Life.
Anti-simplisticators will insist that even a theory as profound as this one
will illuminate only certain aspects of a domain of this complexity.
We should begin by reflecting briefly on what exactly the theory of
evolution is. It is, in part, a series of theses. The first, and perhaps central
thesis, is that life came into being from non-living systems through a long
sequence of intermediate forms. A second is that most, at least, of the
living forms that now exist have common ancestors within this long and
diverging sequence. So far we have nothing that holds out any promise of
telling us anything much about the final products of the evolutionary pro-
cess. The step that enthusiasts hope will accomplish this, is a third thesis,
that changes between successive stages in the evolutionary sequence are
to be explained by the process of natural selection. Of course no one holds
that every such change is a product of natural selection, and I do not want
to get involved here in the controversial question of exactly how much of
evolutionary change is to be explained by natural selection. I shall rather
concede, for the sake of argument, a slightly weaker thesis, that all bio-
logical adaptation is to be explained by natural selection. That is to say,
the features of organisms that contribute to their survival and reproduc-
tion are the products of natural selection. (As will become clear later, I
take this last thesis to have serious problems of interpretation and even
truth.)
Such theses are hardly sufficient to provide the kind of unity or sim-
plicity that is the topic of this paper. For that we need to extract from
these theses something more like a traditional theory. And of course the
theory in question will be the, or a, theory of evolution by natural selec-
tion. What I mean by a ‘traditional theory’ is some statement or statements
of universal form that might figure in a covering law explanation of the
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presence of any adaptive feature of an organism. But here deep problems
begin to appear. First, no one has succeeded in formulating a convincing
universal statement of the theory of evolution by natural selection. This
is not, I think, an accident. One reason why the task is likely to be im-
possible is that evolution by natural selection, unlike, perhaps, gravita-
tional attraction or heat diffusion, is not itself one process. It is at least
two processes, namely natural selection and inheritance.
Evolution by natural selection occurs through repeated cycles of selec-
tion (some members of a population are more successful than others at
surviving and leaving offspring) and inheritance, the tendency of offspring
to be more similar to their parents than to other members of the popu-
lation. And neither of these subprocesses is itself plausibly a simple, ho-
mogeneous process. Selection is increasingly recognized as occurring on
various different levels of organization, and perhaps often doing so si-
multaneously. Inheritance is much messier than that. By inheritance I def-
initely do not mean simply transfer of DNA. I mean to include the whole
process of development by which an organism finally ends up with features
more or less correlated with those of its parents; and no one now supposes
that the provision of DNA is the sole means by which parents cause off-
spring to have features resembling their own. So inheritance, in this sense,
is only very loosely referred to as a single process. It is rather the upshot
of a vast series of interactions involving genes but also features of the
environment that include anything from chemicals in the egg or mother
to interactions with other whole organisms.
The relevance of pointing to the complexity of the processes that are
involved in evolution by natural selection is to indicate their diversity. The
processes of selection and inheritance will vary from particular case to
particular case, and different aspects of each side of the process will be
more or less significant in different cases. Hence any attempt to provide a
general account of the theory of evolution by natural selection must nec-
essarily involve abstraction away from the particularities of individual
cases in a way that must make it false of most of those cases. And hence,
finally, we cannot expect any such universal theory to provide the sort of
D-N explanation machine envisaged in the simplistic unified vision.
It is considerations such as these that have led the majority of philos-
ophers (and perhaps biologists) to see evolution not as providing us with
some kind of universal law in the style of Newtonian mechanics, but rather
as providing a large and open-ended family of models, a tool-kit with
which we can hope to get some understanding of the processes involved
in particular cases. But this move is fatal for unifying aspirations. A uni-
versal law carries with it, so to speak, the instructions for applications to
new cases. You fill in appropriate values for the parameters and churn out
a result. Models aren’t like that. A model is more or less isomorphic to
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the situation it is supposed to model. If you have succeeded in finding a
model that represents the most important factors in a concrete situation,
the model may give you useful information about that situation; if not,
not. Models are only transportable to new situations to the extent that
the same factors are important and no new ones are important. This is a
very restrictive condition, and one that needs to be specifically justified in
any particular case. And this is of course why we aim to assemble a tool-
kit of models. The more diverse our tool-kit, the better chance we have of
finding something that may serve the case in hand.
The best cautionary tales against the violation of these methodological
precepts can be found in what I have in the past referred to as ‘imperialist
economics’. Economics is a model-based science if anything is. The par-
ticular factors relevant to real situations are enormously varied and only
a fat and well-stocked tool-kit will give you much chance of dealing with
particular cases. Unfortunately, however, economics has canonized one
particular super-model and given it a role somewhat like that of the hap-
pily non-existent general theory of evolution by natural selection. This is
the model of the perfectly competitive market. This is in reality a model
of very limited application. Real markets generally have limited numbers
of buyers and sellers, differentiated products, imperfect information, in-
divisible goods, and so on, and thus diverge very considerably from the
assumptions of this ideal model. A good deal of respectable, if sometimes
only modestly successful, work in real economics involves developing
more sophisticated models to take account of these factors. But when
economists venture into the more dubious terrain of markets for sex, chil-
dren, marriage partners, and so on, since there is in fact no real market
at all to suggest realistic restrictions on the model, what tends to get im-
ported into the discussion is the pure concept of market from the super-
model. The concept of ‘market’, one might say, goes on holiday. And the
sort of nonsense generated, even by Nobel laureate economists,2 is sadly
predictable.
It is also relevant at this point to mention a rather different context in
which unification has been promoted, the accounts of explanation as uni-
fication associated with Philip Kitcher and Michael Friedman.3 Very
crudely, this is the idea that we explain phenomena by assimilating them
to other similar phenomena. The larger the groups of phenomena that we
can thus assimilate, the more satisfactory are our explanations of the par-
ticular phenomena within the group. It will be clear from what I have said
so far that the goal suggested by this admittedly crude statement is one
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that I would be very reluctant to endorse. Models, on my view, serve very
limited explanatory roles, and we should not be drawn into trying to apply
them very widely. But perhaps this is to look at explanatory unification
at the wrong level. Perhaps it would be better to see it as a theory ranging
not over explanations but, at a higher level, over tool-kits. The idea then
would be that taking a model out of a very fat tool-kit, with models in it
suitable for a wide range of explanatory tasks, is a more satisfactory ac-
tivity than coming along with a very small tool-kit, containing perhaps
just one model specially designed for the problem in hand (designed, we
might say, ad hoc). Then a task for philosophers might be giving an ac-
count of why a certain large set of models, despite their variety, all belong
in the same tool-box. This is perhaps a plausible interpretation of, for
instance, Kitcher’s (1993) schemata for evolutionary explanations. I must
say, however, that I am inclined to suspect that, even for tool-kits, size
doesn’t matter. It strikes me, at any rate, as largely a pragmatic matter.
Obviously a well-stuffed tool-kit with something for every job is a more
useful thing to carry than one of those apocryphal devices on Swiss army
knives for removing stones from horses’ hooves. But if you should happen
to find yourself desperate to remove a stone from your horse’s hoof, then
that curious little gadget may prove to be just the thing.
I should now return to my main topic of simplistic evolutionary expla-
nations. I want to say something of why the allegedly ‘universal acid’
(Dennett 1995) of evolutionary explanation is often such an unhelpful
reagent for dealing with human matters. I must now distance myself a
little from the third thesis above about evolution. This was the thesis that
adaptive features were always to be explained by natural selection. I want
to point out two problems with this, neither of which is especially original
or unfamiliar.
The first problem, made famous by Steven Jay Gould and Richard
Lewontin’s classic paper, “The Spandrels of San Marco” (1979), is that,
for the purposes of such a thesis, it is very difficult to know what is a
feature. We are interested in explaining those features that resulted
through natural selection. We feel fairly confident that the shape of the
lens of the eye, say, is the right kind of feature for such explanation and
that having a scar over the left eye is not. In between there are all kinds
of features that are on the one hand inherited, but on the other lack ob-
vious functionality, and for which it is entirely unclear whether they are
naturally selected adaptations or not. The basic problem is that the de-
velopment of an organism is a highly integrated process, and much that
happens must be a side-effect of other processes rather than an adapted
feature in its own right—if indeed, this distinction does not already imply
an indefensible atomism. Gould and Lewontin’s famous example was the
human chin, which is a novel feature of human evolution but which, they
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claim, is not a consequence of natural selection for chins, but an epiphe-
nomenon of other changes taking place in the human lineage.
A second problem, particularly salient to the human case, is that nat-
ural selection is not the only source of adaptation. Humans have devel-
oped enormously elaborate systems for surviving and functioning that
have nothing to do with evolution by natural selection. Being a professor
of philosophy is a decent way of making a living, and for all I know
philosophy professors may have an above average fecundity. But not even
the most rabid Panglossian supposes that there are genes for being a phi-
losophy professor. It may well be that to become a philosophy professor
requires a functioning brain, perhaps even an above average functional
brain. And though, of course, the brain evolved, it did not evolve so that
people could become philosophy professors. Being a philosophy professor
is, to use the very useful terminology developed by John Searle (1995), a
social status, something that depends on the consensus of a society, not
merely the physiological features of an organism.
We can now see more clearly the kind of misguided simplification in-
volved in recent attempts to apply evolutionary models to human behav-
ior. Begin with a paradigm of the model of natural selection, the lens of
the eye. We have a great deal of confidence that we know the optimal state
of the lens, through application of a very well entrenched scientific prac-
tice, geometrical optics. We could very probably establish that the devel-
opment of the lens was largely invariant with respect to environmental
features. Not of course entirely invariant: inadequate diet, or nasty par-
asites could no doubt derail it. But under most reasonably favorable con-
ditions for human development most humans will develop functioning
lenses. The speculation that before the introduction of corrective lenses,
greater visual acuity would have been an aid to survival, while still a specu-
lation, is a plausible one. Though we can imagine discoveries that would
refute this, the thesis that the lens is a device for seeing better and that it
evolved by natural selection in favor of individuals who could see better
is a highly convincing one.
Now consider the application of this kind of model to human behavior.
The first problem, typically more severe even than the corresponding dif-
ficulty for physiology, is one of identifying features. A competent anato-
mist should have no great difficulty finding the lens in the eye and spec-
ulating that this is an organ with a specific function. No such organs of
behavior emerge when the human brain is dissected. Evolutionary psy-
chologists have responded to this by imaginatively dissecting brains into
discrete behavioral organs or psychological modules. But here the organs
are not independently discoverable entities but artifacts of the theory.
There is of course fascinating work in neuropsychology in which behav-
ioral deficits are correlated with particular injuries to the brain. But, first,
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this work does not identify social exchange modules or rape modules, but
neural structures necessary for particular tasks such as recognizing objects
or words. And even the discovery of a neural lesion that caused incom-
petence in, for instance, acts of social exchange, would hardly prove the
existence of a module the function of which was to regulate such acts. It
is one of the most characteristic errors of popular behavioral genetics to
suppose that identifying some feature of the brain without which a task
cannot be performed is a way of identifying a feature with the function of
performing that task. One need only compare much less complex struc-
tures. If one removes the cylinders from a car engine the car will not start.
But it is not the function of the cylinders to make the car start. So even
where neural damage can be correlated with particular behavioral defi-
ciencies, not the slightest evidence is thereby provided for the identification
of modules with particular psychological functions. There is, in short, no
evidence whatever for the modules of evolutionary psychology, so there
are, as far as we know, no features for the models to explain.
But even supposing one found a group of brain cells that lit up on one’s
Magnetic Resonance Imaging screen every time someone was engaged in,
say, buying something, would we have identified a suitable target for an
explanation by natural selection, a buying module? Hardly. First, we know
that most people in contemporary societies often buy things, presumably
a condition for any plausible account of the buying module (bizarre and
sometimes offensive stories about, for instance, rape modules, notwith-
standing). We know therefore, by a familiar philosophical maneuvre, that
they are able to buy things. We suppose (ignoring for now some of the
more extreme variants of contemporary shopping) that their brains are
somewhat involved in this capacity. We play around a bit with our MRI
machine and discover that a particular part of the brain is typically en-
gaged when we are making financial transactions. And that, as far as I
can see, is that, though of course we might imaginably go on to tell long
and fascinating stories about the mental processing that was involved in
buying a bottle of shampoo. There is perhaps a development of the story
that would lead us to think that we had discovered a shopping organ, but
before we take such a possibility seriously we need a lot more detail about
what such a devleopment would involve. The great majority of work in
evolutionary psychology is concerned with arguing that particular mod-
ules would have been useful to our distant ancestors. Much less attention
has been devoted to the question of how we might now hope to detect
such modules, or even what it would take for such a thing to exist.
The main moral so far is just to reinforce the claim that as models move
away from the phenomena that they were originally designed to explain,
the abstractions they involve become ever greater impediments to truth or
illumination. But it will perhaps be objected that evolutionary models were
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introduced to explain the features of biological organisms and human
behavior is, in the end, a collection of features of biological organisms. It
may be that we are not yet very good at sorting those features in a way
that is well-suited for providing convincing explanations, but the modules
of contemporary evolutionary psychology are at least an attempt in that
direction and should be applauded. If that project is to be rejected, I need
to say more about what, if anything, is fundamentally different about that
case. One response, drawing on my reference to general critiques of adap-
tationist models by Gould and Lewontin and others, is simply to insist
that such models are not universally suited to the broad range of phenom-
ena just indicated, and so their inapplicability to human behavior needs
no further explanation. More specifically, I might point to the fact that
there is no reason to think that human behavior evolved to do the kinds
of things people do today, and indeed every reason to think the opposite.
No one in the stone age spent much time shopping at the local mall or
writing philosophy papers, and evolutionary considerations can at best
provide us with some of the necessary conditions for the performance of
such activities, hardly a full or satisfying explanation.
Though I think all this is perfectly correct, I would like to gesture to-
ward a deeper problem. The deficiencies of evolutionary psychology derive
also from a more traditional expression of the unifying and simplifying
urge, reductionism. The picture of explanation in such models is thor-
oughly bottom up. The human agent is seen as a complex mechanism
emitting bits of behavior in response to external stimuli. To understand
why particular bits of behavior are emitted we must understand the de-
tailed structure of the mechanism. It seems to me that the application of
this picture is not merely empirically unsuccessful, but conceptually con-
fused. It makes no sense to describe a piece of machinery that is designed,
whether by God or Mother Nature, to emit shopping behavior when con-
fronted by mall-stimuli.
This is simply because shopping is an essentially social phenomenon,
or better, in terms of the useful analysis by Searle to which I have already
alluded, an institutional fact. Shopping essentially involves such things as
money, shops, customers, sales assistants, and so on. Nothing can satisfy
any of these descriptions in the absence of a society that recognizes these
various statuses. And in fact, as Searle convincingly argues, a society can
only recognize these statuses when it has a language, or at any rate a
symbolic system, through which they can be represented. To take just the
most obvious example, nothing can be money simply by virtue of its physi-
cal properties. To be money is, at least, to be socially recognized as money.
Whether or not Robinson Crusoe could learn to talk to himself, he must
wait for Man Friday before he has any chance of going shopping.
There is a rather different question to be asked, to what extent the
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theory of evolution can help us to understand the possibility of shopping.
No doubt we evolved complex brains over millions of years, and without
fairly complex brains we could not form the kinds of society that make
shopping possible. Hypotheses about how we came to acquire such hy-
pertrophied cerebra thus have some distant relevance to the possibility of
shopping. There is also the much more controversial hypothesis that we
wouldn’t have developed such a practice as shopping if we had not, per-
haps in the Stone Age, developed specialized mental equipment for eval-
uating exchanges (or whatever), and that these modules are now engaged
when we enter the mall. It will be clear that I consider such hypotheses as
wholly ungrounded speculation. But my point here is that, even if true,
they would still be of only distant relevance to understanding the possi-
bility and nature of shopping. To do that we must understand the social
conventions and institutions that underlie this complex social practice.
All this is of course just what we should expect. Evolutionary theory is
concerned with the origins of biological phenomena. But to assume that
understanding the origins of a phenomenon is all there is to understanding
it is to commit a crude instance of the genetic fallacy. And in this case we
have compelling reasons to conclude that committing the genetic fallacy
is indeed committing a fallacy.
This, finally, illustrates the more general point of this paper. As a gen-
eral background to biology, as that without which nothing in biology
makes sense, the theory of evolution is little more than a few theses about
the origins of life. These are very important theses for our understanding
of our place in nature, but very sparse as the basis for specific evolutionary
explanations. For the latter we have a well-stocked tool-kit of explanatory
models. But even this well-stocked tool-kit, when we confront real situa-
tions with complications including genetic linkage, pleiotropy, polygeny,
epistasis, complex developmental interactions with the environment, cul-
turally mediated learning, and so on, may prove of only limited efficacy.
In the case of human behavior we are not only confident that all these
complications obtain, but we have a domain of phenomena constituted
not by the biological but by the social. The relevance of biological models
struggling with this array of complexities, and aspiring at best to provide
explanations of hypothetical biological precursors of the social behavior
that is our ultimate concern, is, to say the least, marginal. Only the intox-
ication with the vision of grand theories, the lure of the simplistic, could
inspire us to devote much energy to such a misguided project.
Let me conclude with a more ambitious proposal. Human behavior is
in one sense biological, but it is also fundamentally social. It is culturally
diverse. On occasion it is economic, religious, domestic, competitive or
cooperative, and so on. It is, in short, exceedingly complex. Any grand
unifying theory of human nature can be confidently predicted to distort
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many or most of these complexities. It seems to me that here we should
not even aspire to approach the topic with a unified tool-kit. Indeed, the
more diverse and varied the contents of our tool-kit, the better chance we
have of coming to grips with the really interesting problems about human
behavior. Just as simplicity or simplisticity is naturally connected with
unity, so complexity cries out for plurality. The only route to a deeper
understanding of ourselves is through radical epistemological pluralism.
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